We examine whether firms utilize governance systems and high levels of monitoring mechanisms when information asymmetry and managerial discretion are limited. Given that such monitoring is costly, we expect regulated firms to use less monitoring if it is unimportant. Using data from initial public offerings, we document that regulated firms have greater proportions of monitoring directors and larger boards as well as use similar levels of equity-based compensation as non-regulated firms. Further, regulated and unregulated firms are analogous in turns of observed trade-offs between traditional monitoring mechanisms and inside ownership. Finally, regulated firms appear to decrease monitoring levels following a period of deregulation. These findings support the hypothesis that regulation and governance are complements and are consistent with the notion that regulators pressure firms to adopt effective monitoring structures.
Introduction
Governance mechanisms are costly to implement (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Baker and Gompers, 2003) . When there is a separation of ownership and control, however, the benefits of monitoring may outweigh the costs. In fact, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that monitoring can alleviate agency problems when inside ownership is low. Thus, firms adopt governance mechanisms to align manager and shareholder interests, thereby assuring suppliers of finance a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) .
In an environment where executive decision-making may be more transparent and opportunity sets may be limited, the benefits of monitoring may be reduced (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992, Joskow, Rose, and Shepard, 1993) . Thus, governance mechanisms may be less important in regulated industries. Much of the literature to date has taken a literal interpretation of this relationship, arguing that regulation should substitute for governance.
However, empirical evidence does not fully support this notion (e.g. Hadlock, Lee, and Parrino, 2002; Houston and James, 1995) , raising the question as to why regulated firms adopt governance structures with greater levels of monitoring given the cost.
In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for the relation between regulation and governance that may shed light on why costly governance mechanisms are utilized by firms with restricted opportunity sets. Regulators do not have the same financial interests as shareholders. Their focus is on safety and soundness rather than wealth maximization (Skeel 1999; Joskow et al. 1993) . While regulators do not control specific governance practices, the presence of regulators may pressure firms to adopt effective corporate governance structures that promote safety and soundness. Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian (2002) and Joskow et al. (1993) note that the threat of corrective actions by regulators and the increased scrutiny on regulated firms essentially pressures them to adopt effective monitoring systems. Joskow, Rose, and Wolfram (1996) contend that governance differences are the results of regulatory pressure rather than inherent productivity differences in regulated firms. Regulatory pressure may encourage greater levels of monitoring (e.g., "best practices" approach). Essentially, regulation and governance may work together to ensure an effective governance structure.
We provide a novel approach to examine the relation between regulation and governance.
Our analysis is organized around a corporate event (initial public offering or IPO) rather than in calendar time. Baker and Gompers (2003) note that monitoring mechanisms are more likely optimally chosen at the IPO since existing shareholders bear the cost of suboptimal governance.
Brown, Dittmar, and Servaes (2005) demonstrate that IPO firms with the "proper initial governance structure" have better operating and stock price performance. Wang, Winton, and Yu (2008) contend that monitoring mechanisms are less ambiguous at the IPO. By contrast, in calendar time, governance structures may be as much a consequence of past performance as a measure of the quality of governance. Analyzing structures at the IPO enables us to examine governance while decreasing the impact of prior performance.
Our paper provides strong support that regulatory pressure, rather than substitution, influences governance. We document that regulated firms have governance structures with greater levels of monitoring than unregulated firms at the IPO. If governance mechanisms are unnecessary (regulation substitutes for governance), regulated firms should have lower levels of monitoring. The heightened level of monitoring is not related to firm characteristics typically associated with regulated firms, such as leverage age, or size.
In addition, we examine trade-offs between monitoring mechanisms and ownership after controlling for firm characteristics. If regulation substitutes for governance, the degree of interdependency between traditional monitoring mechanisms and ownership should be lower at regulated firms (Booth et al., 2002) . Regulatory pressure, however, suggests regulation and governance both ensure a "system" of governance where monitoring mechanisms are interchanged (Adams and Mehran, 2003) . We document that monitoring mechanisms serve as alternates for ownership at both regulated and unregulated firms. These results do not indicate that regulation substitutes for governance, but rather suggest that regulation serves as a means of pressuring firms to adopt effective governance systems.
We further examine the impact of regulation on governance structures by analyzing the impact of deregulation. Deregulation increases the importance of the managerial role within a firm and thus the need for monitoring (Kole and Lehn 1997) . Removing regulation introduces additional downside risk, increases managerial discretion, and increases the sensitivity of firm value to the quality of managerial decisions. If regulation substitutes for governance, removing regulation should lead to regulated firms' governance structures more closely mimicking those at unregulated firms (Kole and Lehn, 1999) . However, governance structures of regulated IPOs following a deregulatory period do not more closely resemble those of unregulated IPOs. Postderegulation, regulated firms still have greater levels of monitoring. Further, consistent with the removal of regulatory pressure, some monitoring levels actually decrease post-deregulation.
While this paper focuses on regulated versus unregulated firms, our findings have implications for research on corporate governance more broadly. A debate exists as to whether corporate governance affects market values (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Core, Guay, Rusticus, 2006) . Corporate governance can reduce agency problems and lead to more effective monitoring of managers. However, adopting these mechanisms is costly. In an environment where information asymmetry and managerial discretion are limited, monitoring systems would be redundant (regulation would substitute for governance). Our results, however, are not consistent with this substitution assumption, and provide additional support on the importance of corporate governance in protecting shareholders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the motivation and hypotheses. In section 3, we describe our samples and summary statistics. Section 4 presents empirical results and differences between regulated and unregulated firms at the IPO. In sections 5 and 6, we provide additional specifications and robustness tests, while section 7 concludes.
Motivation

Regulation as a substitute or a complement for governance?
Adams and Ferreira (2006) Joskow et al. (1993) and Joskow et al. (1996) note that compensation structures are most impacted with the degree of regulatory intensity, where it appears electric utilities impacted the most. This impact comes from regulatory pressure rather than "inherent productivity differences." Baxter (2003) argue for a more prominent role for management compensation structures in bank regulation.
However, regulators have been reluctant to adopt strict guidelines limiting compensation policies for healthy banks. Joskow et al. (1993) attribute differences in executive compensation at regulated firms to political pressures. They cite the weaker link between pay and performance at regulated firms as an effort to reflect interests of both consumers and the firm.
Hypotheses
The extant literature has largely focused on the idea that regulation substitutes for governance, but has failed to address empirical inconsistencies. In addition to examining the substitution hypothesis in a new setting, we also propose an alternative hypothesis: regulatory pressure. Regulators focus on safety and soundness rather than shareholder interests, which weakens the substitution argument. Essentially, the substitution hypothesis implies these goals are interchangeable or paired. Rather than substitute, regulators may pressure firms to adopt effective governance structures; regulation and governance may work together and serve as complements rather than substitutes.
To explore if regulation substitutes or complements governance, we test three hypotheses. Further, regulatory pressure may help ensure that firms are at their optimal governance structure.
However, governance mechanisms are costly to implement and firms tend to establish monitoring systems where one measure may be increased when another decreases, suggesting the firm's overall system of governance is also important to examine. When regulation is at least partially removed, the substitution hypothesis predicts traditional monitoring mechanisms will increase as regulators provide less monitoring (Kole and Lehn, 1999) . Deregulation serves as a shock to firms, which then must adapt their governance structures to handle the increased opportunity set and managerial discretion. However, without regulatory pressure, some firms may decide to reduce levels of monitoring if these levels were too high under regulation or if agency problems lead firms to choose less monitoring postderegulation. Essentially, the regulatory pressure hypothesis does not support an increase in monitoring levels following deregulation.
Data and Summary Statistics
We collect data for IPOs in 1993 IPOs in , 1996 IPOs in , and 1998 . Analyzing a sample during the 1990s allows us to examine how deregulation affected governance and provides a powerful test for the pressure and substitution hypotheses. Also, Gompers et al. (2003) Large blockholders may also monitor. Huddart (1993) argues because large shareholders have a stake in profits, they will monitor management more carefully and establish incentives for better performance. Denis and Denis (1995) note forced management turnover may be more related to outside blockholder pressure than to monitoring by the board itself. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) show venture capitalists own economically significant equity positions in portfolio companies and participate in the governance of these firms.
In addition, equity-based compensation may be traded off for inside ownership. One way to align manager and shareholder interests is through ex-ante contracting, where agency costs are mitigated by incentive compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998) .
5 For well-established firms with larger boards, the costs of poor communication and decision-making with a large group may outweigh benefits of additional monitoring. Some evidence on established firms suggests large boards are less efficient (Yermack, 1996) . Adams and Mehran (2005) find the opposite for banking firms. Our focus is not on board efficiency but monitoring potential. Further, Baker and Gompers (2003) note IPO boards are substantially smaller than those of large, public companies, suggesting the large group issues may be less of a concern. 6 Baker and Gompers (2003) group independent outside directors and venture capitalist directors together.
Mehran (1995) finds firms with high inside ownership rely on less equity-based compensation for top executives.
Data for these governance measures are collected from the prospectus and proxy statements. Independent outside directors exclude insiders and "gray" or quasi-outside directors.
To illustrate, former executives, executive spouses, and lawyers or consultants with a working relation are not outsiders. Gray directors are not considered independent directors since they may have conflicting goals. 7 Board size is the total number of directors. Outside blockholders are institutions or companies that own at least 5% of shares outstanding. Inside ownership is the percentage of shares owned by officers and directors. The percentage of incentive compensation is measured as average percentage of compensation that is equity-based for top-executives, whose compensation is reported in the prospectus/proxy. 8 Equity-based components include stock options, restricted stock, and performance shares from long-term incentive plans. 
Degree of regulation
The literature is not always consistent as to which types of firms are considered regulated. We consider a spectrum of regulation from partially to heavily regulated firms.
Heavily regulated include banks, savings institutions, and gas and electric utility companies.
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Prior studies suggest these industries face an enhanced level of regulatory influence. Both depository institutions and public utilities have experienced deregulation over recent years; however, they remain substantially regulated.
7 Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Adams and Mehran, 2003) , directors with lending relationships with the bank or savings institutions are not eliminated from being labeled independent. 8 Results are robust to using the percentage of equity-based compensation for the CEO only. 9 To calculate stock option grant values, we apply a variant of Black-Scholes (Noreen and Wolfson, 1981) . In the year pre-offering, we estimate stock return variance two ways. First, we use twenty-day after market standard deviation (Beatty and Zajac, 1994) . Second, we use industry median annual standard deviation of monthly returns for the year pre-IPO (Baker and Gompers, 1999) . Industries are defined at the four-digit SIC level (or 3-digit level if insufficient data are available). The methods produce near identical results as the correlation between these two values is 0.99. Results are reported using the Beatty and Zajac (1994) approach. 10 While sample sizes are too small to examine utilizes and banks separately, we include a dummy variable for banks. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported when we add this control.
Partially regulated firms include transportation, telecommunications, and other financial, non-depository firms. The literature is inconsistent on how to treat these firms. Booth et al. The telecommunications industry also has been partially deregulated, but not completely (Crandall, 2002) . Other financial firms include insurance, securities brokers, mortgages, and real estate. Such companies act as financial intermediaries, but are less regulated and subject to greater market discipline than depository institutions (Brewer, Mondschean, and Strahan, 1993) .
Nonetheless, these firms still face regulations and restrictions not faced by unregulated firms.
In our analyses, we examine both all regulated and heavily regulated firms. Including all regulated firms allows us to measure the broad impact of any regulation and its effect on governance. However, the degree of regulation varies greatly and the relation between regulation and governance likely depends on the nature and scope of regulation. To address this, we examine heavily regulated firms separately. If regulation substitutes for traditional monitoring, regulation should provide a more complete substitute at heavily regulated firms (and similarly if regulation acts as a pressure). In other words, a more powerful test is to compare heavily regulated firms to unregulated firms, in effect controlling for the degree of regulation.
A firm's SIC code is used to separate heavily, partially, and non-regulated firms. To determine if a firm was a heavily regulated utility, we start with all IPOs with an SIC code of 4900-4939 (electric and gas), 1300 (oil and gas extraction); and 6710-6719 (holding companies).
For banking firms, we start with all firms with an SIC code of 6020-6039 as well as 6710-6719 suggesting the increase occurs post-IPO. Regulated firms are significantly larger and older than unregulated firms but we find no significant differences in terms of tangible assets or ROA.
Heavily regulated firms are less likely to have a founder involved, which may be consistent with these firms being older at the IPO. Heavily regulated firms have the lowest adjusted q values.
Complements or Substitutes
Monitoring levels
To explore whether regulation substitutes for or complements governance, we begin by examining levels of monitoring for all regulated, heavily regulated, and unregulated firms (Hypothesis 1). Summary statistics in Table 2 Overall, our results are more consistent with the regulatory pressure hypothesis, where regulated firms feel pressure to adopt governance structures that provide higher levels of monitoring.
The differences documented above may not be related to regulated vs. unregulated firms per se; rather regulated firms may have specific characteristics that require extra monitoring.
Prior studies find that regulated firms tend to be more highly levered, larger, and older than unregulated firms. In Table 3 we test whether differences in monitoring levels are driven by these characteristics. Following Booth et al. (2002), we use total debt divided by total assets to proxy for leverage, while we proxy size with the natural log of total assets at the IPO. 11 The number of years since a firm's first date of incorporation until the IPO captures firm age.
In Panels A-C, we divide our sample into three groups (high, medium, and low) based on leverage, size and age. These groups do not consider whether the firm was regulated. If firm characteristics drive observed differences in monitoring levels, these differences should follow a similar pattern for firms with heavily regulated, regulated, and unregulated firms. To illustrate, 11 All results are qualitatively similar using one minus the ratio of the book value of equity to total assets for leverage (Houston and James, 1995 
Multivariate analyses
Next, we examine the trade-offs between monitoring mechanisms and inside ownership (Hypothesis 2). 12 In Table 4 we regress each measure of governance (monitoring directors and holdings, board size, and incentive compensation) on inside holdings, firm characteristics, and other controls. We include binary variables equal to one for all or heavily regulated firms and an interaction term between these variables and inside holdings. For all firms, we expect other monitoring mechanisms to serve as alternatives to inside holdings. With regulatory pressure, the interaction term should be insignificant, consistent with regulated and unregulated firms trading off mechanisms in a similar manner. In other words, trade-offs between mechanisms will be the same at regulated firms if regulatory pressure forces firms to have an optimal system. The notion of an optimal system of governance is similar to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) where governance is insignificant in firm performance regressions. In contrast, the substitution hypothesis would suggest a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term. In this case, regulated firms would not be establishing monitoring systems where mechanisms are traded off for one another.
We control for additional factors that may affect the need for monitoring mechanisms.
13 Gompers (1995) argues the need for monitoring increases as the tangibility of assets decline (ratio of tangible to total assets). Intangible assets are associated with higher agency costs since their liquidation values are lower. We also include a binary variable equal to one if the founder is an officer or director at the IPO, since governance may differ if the founder is involved. We control for shares outstanding (natural log) to control for the public float. We control for profitability using return on assets (ROA). 14 Baker and Gompers (2003) show venture capitalist involvement shapes the board of directors; we include a binary variable equal to one if the IPO firm was backed by a venture capitalist. In addition, we include time dummy variables for the sample years to control for the fact governance structures may have evolved over the 1990s. For example, most firms have increased the proportion of independent directors over calendar time.
Numerous studies argue a link exists between firm performance and governance. For firm performance and growth opportunities, we use Chung and Pruitt's (1994) approximation of Tobin's q 15 , the sum of market value of common stock, long-and short-term debt, and preferred stock all divided by total assets. Research has shown that Tobin's q may also proxy for industry characteristics, making it important to adequately control for industry effects. We subtract 13 Our control variables are similar to those used by Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian (2002) . However, we include more IPO-specific controls such as tangible assets, control for founders, profitability, and others. 14 Results are robust to using return on equity as a proxy for profitability. 15 Chung and Pruitt (1994) show that this approximation explains 96.6% of the variation in the more theoretically appropriate procedure suggested by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) .
median Tobin's q ratio from each firm's performance measure for firms in the same four-digit SIC code. In banking, numerous studies implement a market-to-book ratio to control for investment opportunity set or market power (Smith and Watts 1992 , Houston and James 1995 , Keeley 1990 ). Thus, our measure also controls for differing investment opportunity sets. Finally, we include proxies for leverage, age, and size to ensure firm characteristics do drive differences.
In Table 4 , we show that trade-offs exist for inside holdings. The coefficient on inside holdings is negative and significant when monitoring directors and holdings, as well as equitybased compensation are dependent variables. All IPO firms replace inside holdings with these other monitoring mechanisms. However, firms do not appear to turn to monitoring from larger boards to compensate for low levels of inside ownership, which may be related to inefficiencies associated with larger boards. Yermack (1996) suggests costs of poor communication and decision-making with a large group outweigh the benefits of increased monitoring potential. Table 4 support the regulatory pressure hypothesis; regulated and unregulated firms do not differ in interdependences between mechanisms (Hypothesis 2B). Specifically, the interaction term between heavily regulated firms and inside holdings is insignificant in all models. If regulation substitutes for governance, trade-offs should not exist and the interaction should capture any differences from unregulated firms. However, we find no differences, perhaps suggesting firms are at their optimal structure (Bakers and Gompers, 2003, etc.) . Using a broader definition of regulation (all regulated firms), the interaction term remains insignificant except when incentive compensation is the dependent variable. 16 These results may be related to the fact executive compensation is the governance area most influenced by regulation. 
Results in
Deregulation
Banks and utilities both experienced significant deregulation in the 1990s (Energy Policy Act of 1992, FIDICIA, Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, additional rules by the SEC and FERC, etc.).
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Kole and Lehn (1997) find that deregulation increases the importance of the managerial role within a firm and thus the need for monitoring. Specifically, they note that incentives to develop low cost methods of production, product market competition, and innovative pricing and distribution strategies are severely reduced under regulation. In addition, Kole and Lehn (1997) note that regulation often inhibits acquisitions either explicitly or implicitly by limiting merger gains. Thus, removing regulation introduces additional downside risk and increases managerial discretion. Firm value becomes more sensitive to the quality of managerial decisions.
17 Separate regressions for all regulated, heavily regulated, and unregulated firms are also conducted. The results are qualitatively similar. Essentially, we find similar trade-offs between monitoring mechanisms for both regulated and unregulated firms. Equity-compensation continues to be somewhat different. 18 We also try omitting the interaction terms. suggesting levels are lower post-deregulation. These results provide support for the notion that as deregulation occurs, regulatory pressure is decreased and firms decrease monitoring.
Overall, Tables 5 and 6 provide evidence regulation is a complement for governance.
Relaxing regulation does not appear to cause regulated firms to utilize governance structures similar to those favored by unregulated firms or to significantly increase monitoring levels. Postderegulation, regulated firms utilize governance structures with decreased in monitoring holdings, consistent with the regulatory pressure hypothesis.
Additional Specifications
Matched Sample
Our results could be driven by the unbalanced nature of our sample, since the number of unregulated firms is larger than that of heavily regulated firms. To explore this, we construct a matched sample. We match every heavily regulated firm to an unregulated firm based on size (for consistency with past studies that suggest size may be explain differences in monitoring levels for regulated and unregulated firms). In Table 7 , we report summary statistics using heavily regulated firms and their matches. The patterns reported mirror those reported in Table 2 and support the regulatory pressure hypothesis. Regulated firms have greater proportions of monitoring directors, larger boards, but less monitoring holdings. Again we find no significant differences in percentages of equity-based compensation.
Regression results for the matched sample (Table 8) are directly comparable to those reported in Table 4 . The interaction term for heavily regulated firms and inside holdings is again insignificant in all specifications, which supports the regulatory pressure hypothesis. We continue to find evidence firms trade-off monitoring directors and monitoring holdings for inside holdings. For board size, we find a positive relation, which may again reflect the inefficiencies of increasing board sizes. In other words, if inside ownership is low, firms prefer smaller boards.
With equity-based compensation, we do not find evidence firms trade-off compensation for inside ownership. However, if we examine only unregulated matched firms, the coefficient on inside holdings is marginally significant in the incentive compensation equation; suggesting unregulated firms use incentive compensation when ownership levels are low. This result highlights that regulation may at least partially substitute for compensation at the IPO. We also run separate models for heavily regulated firms and their matches and obtain qualitatively similar results. 22 Overall, our results using the matched sample also support the regulatory pressure hypothesis, where firms establish monitoring systems. We find that alternative monitoring mechanisms are exchanged for inside ownership at regulated firms and unregulated firms alike.
Monitoring Systems
We have focused on substitutes for inside ownership. Given that an IPO is an event designed to significantly alter ownership structures, it seems likely that other monitoring mechanisms would be increased at the time of the IPO as a trade off to the reduction in monitoring. However, other interdependences between monitoring mechanisms exist (Berry et al. 2006) , suggesting a system of equations. Since our previous results show that board size is 22 To be consistent with Table 4 , we repeat all these tests including the year dummies with qualitatively similar results. We omit these in Table 8 
Year +2 Results
Baker and Gompers (2003) suggest that governance structures are more likely to be chosen optimally at the IPO. However, it is possible that a firm's governance structure evolves following the IPO. The substitution effect may set in only after the firm has been public for some period of time. As a result, we examine governance structures two years after the IPO ( (Table 4) , we document that all regulated firms are less likely to turn toward equity-based compensation when inside ownership is low.
Two years following the IPO, however, we see strong evidence of a trade-off between these mechanisms, which is consistent with regulatory pressure.
Robustness
Additional characteristics may drive differences between regulated and non-regulated firms and failure to control for these characteristics may lead to spurious conclusions. First, regulated firms may face differing political and legal environments, which may shape their boards. To illustrate, regulated firms may be more involved in politics because of regulation, making it optimal for these firms to add outsiders to the board to help manage the political landscape. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) and Helland and Sykuta (2004) Second, for the 1998 sample we separate venture capitalists from insiders for our 3,000 directors.
The correlation between inside ownership with and without venture capitalists is extremely high.
However, we encounter difficulties splitting ownership. In many cases, total director and officer ownership does not equal the sum of ownership listed by these individuals. To reconcile ownership, we must create "plug" values for 25% of our firms. The average plug size is nontrivial: 184,605 shares (3.71%) pre-IPO and 186,396 shares (4.75%) post-IPO (maximum 1,309,238 shares or 44.78%). Given these uncertainties, we do not focus on these numbers.
Third, we repeat analyses for non venture-backed IPOs only. Results are qualitatively similar, suggesting our findings are not biased by the inclusion of venture capitalists on the board.
Our measure of director and officer ownership may double count independent outsiders' ownership if they own a significant stake in the firm (unaffiliated blockholder). We implement several measures to control for this potential bias. First, outside blockholdings appear similar at both regulated and unregulated firms; suggesting both groups would experience similar biases (if one exists). Second, for the 1998 sample we collect data on the 3,000 directors and document when independent outside directors are associated with outside blockholders. Only 50 outside directors at 28 firms (total includes 606 independent outside directors at 281 firms) are affiliated with outside blockholders. For 30 of these directors, no double counted shares exist; individual shares are zero or the proxy indicates shares are independent from those of the blockholder.
Double counting could only exist for 20 directors at 17 firms. Third, segmenting ownership is difficult; the correlation between inside ownership with and without double counted shares is 0.94. Finally, we repeat all analyses for IPOs with no outside blockholdings. While this is a severe restriction, results are qualitatively similar. Overall, our measure of inside ownership does not appear biased by independent outside directors having a large stake in the firm. Tables 7 and 8 compare a set of matched firms to our heavily regulated sample, where firms are selected based on asset size. Given the skewness in firm size for our regulated firms, we repeat analyses matching on market value of equity; all results are qualitatively similar. To examine if leverage has a nonlinear relationship with our dependent variables we include a squared term in all tests. The squared term, however, is never significant and has no effect on results. For our unregulated firms, we include Fama French industry dummies (17 industries).
The results remain unchanged as we continue to find trade-offs between monitoring mechanisms.
Additionally, analyses in Tables 1, 2 , 3, 5, and 8 are repeated testing for differences in medians rather than differences in means. Results are qualitatively similar. Finally, excluding year dummy variables in Tables 3 and 6 does not alter our results. Even after addressing these additional confounding factors, it does not appear regulation substitutes for governance at the time of the IPO but rather serves as a complement.
Conclusions
Monitoring mechanisms are costly to adopt. In regulated industries, executive decisionmaking is more transparent and opportunity sets are limited, suggesting governance mechanisms may be less important. The literature to date has focused largely on the notion that regulation substitutes for governance. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. In this paper, we propose an alternative explanation for the relation between regulation and governance. Specifically, we contend that the presence of regulators may pressure firms to adopt effective corporate governance structures that promote safety and soundness.
We examine governance structures at regulated and unregulated firms at the time of their IPO, when governance is more likely to be optimal (Baker and Gompers 2003). We document that regulated firms do not have significantly lower levels of monitoring as predicted by the substitution hypothesis. These firms have greater proportions of monitoring directors and larger boards as well as use similar levels of equity-based compensation. These results support Adams and Ferreira's (2006) contention that board oversight appears to be a complement to regulation.
When we examine the substitution and pressure hypotheses in a multivariate setting, we again find support for regulatory pressure. Specifically, at both regulated and unregulated firms, trade-offs exist between traditional monitoring mechanisms and inside ownership, which is consistent with regulation serving to pressure firms to develop a system of governance. If regulation substitutes for governance, the degree of interdependencies would be less or not present at regulated firms. The notable exception is executive compensation. We find some evidence that regulation does at least partially substitute for equity-based compensation. This result is not surprising given that incentive compensation is the only monitoring mechanism that regulators exert direct control over (Houston and James, 1995) .
Finally, we examine whether deregulation is a shock to regulated firm's governance structure (Kole and Lehn 1997). Deregulation increases competition, opportunity sets, and a firm's sensitivity to managerial decisions. With the substitution hypothesis, deregulation would reduce monitoring thus forcing firms to strengthen their governance structures to more closely resemble those of unregulated firms. In contrast, the regulatory pressure hypothesis predicts a likely decrease in monitoring levels following deregulation due to the removal of pressure).
Again, our results support the regulatory pressure hypothesis. Post-deregulation, governance structures of regulated firms do not more closely mirror those of unregulated firms and significantly decrease in several cases.
Our results suggest that regulation and governance are complements where regulators may pressure firms to adopt effective monitoring structures. The regulatory pressure hypothesis provides an explanation for some often puzzling empirical findings in the literature. This paper also has implications for the governance literature in general. Essentially, we examine whether firms utilize governance systems and high levels of monitoring mechanisms when information asymmetry and managerial discretion are limited. Given that such monitoring is costly, we would expect firms to use less or none if such monitoring were not important. However, our results are not consistent with substitution, implying governance systems are important to shareholders. Regulation does not replace traditional monitoring. Finally, our results provide additional support for the arguments of Wang, Winton, and Yu (2008) that regulators play an important role even in the presence of monitoring.
Table 1 Firm Characteristics
This table reports means for firm characteristics for heavily regulated, partially regulated, and unregulated firms. The p-value reports the significance of the difference between the sample means. Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Age is the number of from the first date of incorporation until the IPO. Tangible assets are the ratio of tangible to total assets. Founder is a binary variable equal to one if the founder is present at the IPO. Adjusted q is Chung and Pruitt's (1994) approximation of Tobin's q, adjusted for the industry median. The sample contains 928 unregulated, 223 regulated, and 58 heavily regulated firms. All Regulated includes partially and heavily regulated firms. 
Table 3 Firm Characteristics and Monitoring Levels
This table reports means for monitoring levels based on whether various firm characteristics were high, medium, or low. In Panel A, the sample is divided by leverage (total debt divided by total assets). In Panel B, the sample is divided by size (natural log of total assets). In Panel C, the sample is divided by age (number of years from incorporation until IPO). The p-value reports the significance of the difference between sample means. Monitoring directors (holdings) is the sum of independent outside directors (holdings) and venture capitalist directors (holdings). Equity-based compensation is the average percentage of incentive compensation for the top executives. The sample consists of 928 are unregulated firms, 175 are partially regulated firms, and 58 are heavily regulated firms. The sample includes the all regulated and heavily regulated firms. Data are for two years after the IPO year. Monitoring directors (holdings) is the sum of independent outside directors (holdings) and venture capitalist directors (holdings). Equity-based compensation is the average percentage of incentive compensation for the top executives. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** , ** , * signifies significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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